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DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN PORTUGAL
Preface
I was required by my terms of reference to advise the Central 
Planning Department in Lisbon in preparing a methodology for 
the drawing up of an Annex to the next medium-term 
Plan 1979-84, to cover longer-term planning. I interpreted 
the terms of reference as requiring me to look at the longer- 
term work which might be done in the Central Planning Depart­
ment in a general sense, since it seems difficult to separate 
out the specific task of supplementing the medium-term plan.
In any case, the status of the medium-term plan 1979-84 was 
doubtful when I was in Lisbon, because of political 
uncertainties.
I was in Portugal from 15 to 24 October 1978,* based at the 
Central Planning Department, which had requested my visit from 
the OECD technical co-operation service. I worked with 
Mr Victor Pessoa, the Director-General; Mrs Maria-Jose Constanci©, 
Director of Global Planning; and Mr Ferreira Mendes, in charge 
of long-term studies. They gave me every help, in 
particular arranging a series of meetings with planning 
officials in the Department and in ether Ministries.
However, the time at my disposal was short in view of the task.
To make recommendations on planning in its true sense requires 
a deep knowledge of the political situation and its dynamics, 
and of the administrative structures and practices, especially 
the strengths and weaknesses of each main ministry. It needs 
an appreciation of the true long-term priorities of the actual 
and potential leadership (which may not always correspond to 
public rhetoric). It is hard for a foreigner to learn enough 
about such matters, especially on a short visit. This limitation 
should be borne in mind by the reader.
* This followed a visit by Manfred Bienefeld and myself in 1976, 
to advise on planning in the industrial sector.
The Lessons of Past Planning and Implications of Joining the 
European Economic Communities
The Portuguese Constitution of April 1976 requires the 
preparation of plans. It is easy to see why. Although 
Portugal was once one of the leading countries of Europe, it 
has, in various senses, fallen far behind the rest of the 
continent, especially since the war. Its infant mortality 
rate is 2\ times as high as the average in the members of the 
EEC. Economic, social and political problems are severe, 
chronic and inter-related. In many areas, unemployment is 
high? housing quality very bad; educational levels low; 
health conditions poor. ^  The country has become 
economically and technologically dependent. A socio­
economic structure that rested in part on trade with the 
African colonies and migration to North-West Europe has been 
under increasing strain. It has become hard even to pay for 
essential foods. One could hardly hope that, if matters 
were just allowed to take their course, the country would 
catch up with its neighbours and overcome its dualism.
As a prelude to discussing the role and nature of Portuguese 
planning in the future, let us look briefly at the lessons 
of past attempts in this field. Before 25 April 1974, four 
plans were prepared. These reflected the simplistic ideology 
of the time - that Portugal's problems were essentially economic 
and could be cured by economic expansion, the benefits of which 
would 'trickle down' to the poor.
Moreover, these plans emphasised a few big and glamorous 
projects, such as petrochemical complexes, an oil refinery, 
the Tagus bridge and motorways. Many of these projects were, 
on various criteria, the opposite of what the country needed:
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN PORTUGAL
(1) For a summary, see "Regional Problems and Policies in 
Portugal" (OECD, 1978).
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both in construction and in use, they were import-intensive 
and labour-saving. As they were situated in the more 
developed parts of the country, they diverted scarce capital 
and expertise from the crucial tasks of raising agricultural 
output and building social infrastructure, especially in the 
rural areas.
4. So, although economic growth was moderately fast (about 6-7% 
a year in real terms), social problems remained severe and 
some of them grew worse, aggravating the regional imbalance.
Wages were held to levels which were becoming very low by 
comparison with those in France and West Germany, but never­
theless, the economy was incapable of absorbing the growth in 
the labour force. Two quasi-solutions emerged in response 
to the widening gap between wage levels in Portugal and else­
where in Europe: labour emigrated in increasing numbers and
a growing flow of foreign tourists commenced. By 1974, the 
economy was relying on emigrants' remittances and tourist 
earnings to cover a large part of import needs, including- 
food. Thus, the country had become heavily dependent on 
events in North Western Europe as well as Africa.
5. Both these props of the Portuguese economy were removed 
simultaneously. After the turn of the decade, due to growing 
African nationalism, the costs of maintaining the empire 
mounted and, at the same time, resistance to immigration 
increased in Western Europe and bans,such as the Gastarbeiterstop, 
were imposed. The fourth plan, published early in 1974, was 
thus already an anomaly: it provided for other countries to
do what they were no longer able to do: absorb the whole
increase in the Portuguese labour force. Moreover, the sharp 
increase in the price of oil at the end of 1973, apart from 
raising Portugal's import bill, had already precipitated a 
world economic recession, further discouraging labour migration, 
as well as weakening the markets for Portuguese exports, and 
throwing doubt on the continued expansion of tourism.
6 . In the absence of democratic institutions, there was, however, 
no way of modifying the basic strategy, and the political 
explosion of 25 April 1974 was, in a sense, its logical 
culmination. The withdrawal from the African colonies and the
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return of more than 400 thousand settlers undermined a socio­
economic structure by now precarious. Subsequent p l a n s ^  
were attempts to find strategies involving far-reaching change. 
In 1975, a Programme of Social and Economic Policy was 
published (the "Melo Antunes Plan"), and in 1977, a Medium-Term 
Plan for 1977-80. There were also two other more economic 
plans, the Transitional Economic Plan of 1976 (for 1976-78), 
and in 1978 the Main Economic Guidelines for 1979-84 ("Prelim­
inary Report on the Definition of the Main Strategic Options", 
published in July).
7. These four plans contain a wealth of information, especially 
the supplementary volumes of the Medium-Term Plan. But there 
was a rapid succession of governments, and, in fact, not one 
of the plans was officially adopted.
8. Moreover, their influence on decisionmaking appears to have 
been limited. I gather contacts between the central decision­
makers and the Central Planning Department have" never been 
very close and the attention of the former has increasingly 
focussed on the immediate foreign exchange deficit. The 
seriousness of this deficit is beyond question, but the planners 
were not well placed to raise the important issue of
which package of short-term measures would be most compatible 
(or least incompatible) with the longer-term needs for human 
and material capital. After all, the possibility of achieving 
basic foreign exchange equilibrium depends partly on the level 
and structure of investment.
9. The root of the isolation of the Central Department of Planning 
seems to have been a belief that the objective of 'planning1 is 
to prepare and publish plans. An alternative conception of 
'planning' is that it is staffwork to help those who take the 
key decisions to see the wider and longer-term implications and 
to achieve consistency between decisions in different areas.
A plan document containing projections is nothing more than 
one of the possible aids to satisfying these needs. It is
(1) Other than the annual plans which have also been prepared.
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certainly by no means sufficient in itself: the achievement
of foresight and consistency depends on the balance of 
political forces and the personal styles of work of those 
with political power. Unless the political context is 
appropriate, paper plans may not merely represent a waste of 
resources; they may actually divert attention from the 
failure to plan. The publication of a plan carries the 
implication that the political leadership are committed to 
its objectives and determined to implement it. In many 
countries where plans have been published, there has been 
neither such commitment nor such determination: indeed, while
the planning officials themselves have been hectically working 
on elaborate plans, the real decisions affecting the country's 
future (e.g. on levels of investment, systems of education, 
even exchange rates and interest rates, etc) have often been 
taken without the Director of Planning even being consulted.
lO- Conversely, some governments have successfully planned national 
development without any formal plan. An Economic Planning 
Agency was created in Tokyo after the war, but the Japanese 
economy had already, of course, been strongly guided from the 
centre for nearly a century, in war and in peace. Almost 
everywhere in the world, war economies, especially in recent 
decades, have been planned, though not usually within a formal 
framework of national income accounts. The crucial question 
in planning is not whether the leadership publishes plans, but 
whether it makes use of another instrument of planning which 
is much more essential, namely machinery (formal or informal) 
for interdepartmental co-operation. A question mark can be 
raised over whether such co-operation has been effective in 
Portugal.
11. It is also questionable whether the planning horizon has been
appropriate for problems so profound that their elimination will 
take more than a decade. Little impact is going to be made on 
slums, illiteracy, ill health or even unemployment in a period 
of not much more than a thousand days. This is not to deny tha
plans covering three or four years can be useful. This period 
corresponds to the term some governments might expect when 
they assume office, and it is short enough for some of the
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exogenous factors to be forecast with a degree of precision. 
Indeed, some might argue that the longer-term economic future 
for such a dependent economy is so obscure, the political
situation so unstable and the statistics so weak, that planning 
with more distant horizons would serve little purpose. So 
the best that can be hoped for is some progress in the next 
few years. Such an argument particularly appeals to those 
who continue to believe that economic growth per se will 
alleviate problems, since estimates can be made of the economic 
requirements for medium-term growth.
12. All these objections to longer-term or development planning 
have weight and they certainly need to be taken into account.
But there are good reasons for thinking that such planning 
would have been helpful, and they point towards the methodology 
needed.
13. In the first place, development planning would have provided a 
framework within which not merely stabilisation measures, but 
also major policies and annual budgets, could have been assessed. 
It would have kept fundamental objectives in front of decision­
makers, and strengthened the hands of those who wanted to 
emphasise development needs. Indeed, a plan for the medium 
term might well have represented a map of part of a much longer 
route. And specific commitment to fundamental solutions of
a country's problems would have contributed to public willingness 
to forego immediate benefits and put up with sacrifices seen as 
only necessary for a few years. In fact, political instability 
is probably an argument for, rather than against, adopting basic 
objectives that will take some time to achieve.
14. In any case, changes of government need not have meant that 
planning, especially for the longer term, was wasted. After 
all, planning is not just (or even mainly) the preparation of 
'plans' - it is the accumulation of material on the country's 
needs and the preparation and revision of analyses showing 
decisionmakers the strategic options. Moreover, goals need 
not be abandoned whenever governments fall. There have been, 
of course, considerable differences among politicians about what 
bort of society to aim at. But across a wide range of the 
Portuguese political spectrum, there seems to be a measure of
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agreement on certain broad economic and political goals, such 
as the elimination of illiteracy or the provision of adequate 
energy supplies or the creation of appropriate systems of 
transportation, even if these might not always be defined in 
the same way by everyone or given the same degree of priority. 
Indeed, it might have been easier to obtain Cabinet and 
Parliamentary approval for a set of such goals than for a 
medium-term plan, and once these had been endorsed, they would 
not have required fresh political endorsement for some years.
15. Secondly, longer-term planning would have facilitated project 
evaluation. The lead times in many investments - most 
obviously in education, electric power, irrigation and 
transport, but also for some large industrial projects - are 
considerably longer than four years. Decisions on projects 
in these sectors (e.g. Sines and Alqueva) could only have been 
properly taken in the light of the expected contribution of 
such projects to the needs of the period after they mature.
There are familiar statistical problems about estimating their 
costs and benefits, not least because of the inadequacy of the 
data, but broad orders of magnitude are a better basis for 
decision than sheer intuition.
16. These two considerations must have been in the minds of those 
who inserted explicit reference to long-term planning (as well 
as annual and medium-term) in the 1976 Constitution. But 
there is now a third. This arises out of the Portuguese 
application in 1977 to join the European Economic Communities. 
'Serious negotiations' about the terms of entry and membership 
are just commencing and are expected to run for at least two 
years. The shock of entry could be b r u t a l ^  and the membership 
terms eventually settled will largely determine the future of 
Portugal for generations. The brief of the Portuguese nego­
tiators will not merely cover the consequences of harmonising 
tariffs, policies, etc, with those of the EEC, of removing
(1) "Accession ... would be liable to aggravate Portugal's
economic difficulties; it could force enterprises not yet 
fully developed to go out of business altogether, and it 
could further accentuate regional disparities", opinion on 
Portuguese application for membership, Bulletin of the EEC, 
Suppl 5/78, para 8 . This document draws attention to the 
special vulnerability of parts of agriculture which could 
be hit "very hard indeed".
- 7 -
barriers on movements of labour and capital and of instituting 
transition periods of various lengths. Presumably the agenda 
will also include what financial, technical and other support 
is needed from the Community's institutions (such as Social and 
Regional Funds and the European Investment Bank), if Portugal, 
especially its underdeveloped regions, is to reach levels of 
economic, political and social development that would enable 
them to contribute to the prosperity, stability and security 
of the Community. Indeed, from another point of view, the 
Portuguese Government itself will want to consider what 
fundamental changes are needed in the country's socio-economic 
structure if it is to avoid damage from entry into the EEC and 
play a constructive role t h e r e a f t e r . ^
17. The "Main Economic Guidelines", which shows inter alia how
large an external deficit would be implied by various rates
of economic growth and related levels of employment, etc,
is a useful first step towards such a brief. But the full
case requires- material with a longer-term perspective, drawing
(2 )on the work done for the Medium-Term Plan.
18. The arguments of the Portuguese delegation will be presented of 
course within a wider discussion of how the whole economic and 
social structures of the Community need adaptation to its 
enlargement, especially given the context of a chronic general 
recession and falling production in some key European industries.
And the role of the EEC in alleviating the regional problems of 
Portugal cannot be discussed except in the context of regional 
development for the whole Community. The entry of the three
new candidates requires in effect what would be a sort of West European 
Development Plan, with special provision for the needs of 
backward countries and areas, and something of the sort will 
emerge, whether or not such a label is politically convenient.
The Portuguese negotiators will want to be ready to make a
(1) "Appropriate development programmes drawn up by the Portuguese 
authorities in collaboration with the Community, with 
Community financing, could provide a suitable framework for 
intervention", EEC ibid, para 16.
(2) And the related document "Planning for Employment and Basic 
Needs in Portugal", ILO mimeo, July 1978.
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contribution to this restructuring of Western Europe that 
reflects Portuguese requirements.
19. Several issues raised by the application are therefore essentially 
the same as those treated by development planning, making it more 
imperative that the lessons of the past be drawn.
II An Inventory of Sectoral Development Plans currently available
20- In accordance with the constitutional requirement for a long­
term plan, a special post was created for this purpose in the 
Central Planning Department. The official concerned started 
by asking various Ministries to provide draft sector plans 
covering the period up to 1990. The response has been very 
uneven. A draft of substance was prepared by the Ministry
of Industry and Tech n o l o g y , ^  analysing the trends in the 
world economy, and going on to identify dynamic industries with 
potention for earning or saving foreign exchange in the EEC.
Other professionally thorough reports had already been made by
(2) (3)the Ministry of Transport and the Electricity Department.
The National Institute of Statistics (INE) has provided
(4)estimates of the growth in population for this period and 
these were used by the Ministry of Labour for labour force 
projections.^ Papers have also been prepared of varying 
degrees of thoroughness on the prospects for uranium exploration, 
tourism and the consumption of petroleum products. Long-term 
policy on science and technology is mentioned in several papers 
of the National Board for Scientific and Technological Research
(JNICT). A paper on social change was commissioned from
Mr Robert R o w l a n d , ^  emphasising the Department's recognition
(1) "Desenvolvimento industrial, topicos de analise prospectiva" 
by Joao Oliveira Rendeiro (June 1978).
(2) "Estudos prospectivos" (5 vols, July 1977).
(3) "Evolucao do Consumo de Energia Electrica em Portugal" (5 
vols, various dates).
(4) "Projeccoes demograficas para 1990" (August 1977).
(5) "Projeccoes da populacao activa para o periodo 1975-90" 
(undated).
(6) "Mudancas Sociais em Portugal: Perspectivas e Condicionante? 
de Longo Prazo" (September 1978).
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of the non-economic aspects of planning: this starts with a
socio-economic analysis and then puts forward hypotheses on 
the evolution up to 1990 in social fields, with indications 
of research needs.
21. There has also been a certain amount of discussion of long­
term policy on agriculture, housing and energy, but there 
seems to be no educational planning at all, no attempt to make 
projections of skill or professional requirements, not even 
estimates of the need for school places in the 1980s, and thus 
for teachers, etc. ^  (There is a three-page paper on school 
building needs, but this was prepared by the Public Works 
Department.) Almost the only clues to long-term needs
in these last areas are contained in the volumes of the Medium- 
Term Plan, but the implications for the period after 1980 were 
naturally not drawn in this document.
22. So a few pieces relevant to the country's development needs exist.
But they do not by any means completely cover the socio­
economic structure. Moreover, one problem will emerge when 
these various sectoral plans and perspectives are used as 
sources for development planning, because they have been 
derived by a variety of methodologies - some by simple extra­
polation of trends (over different periods); some by
assuming that in 1990 the level and pattern of consumption in 
Portugal will be like that of a somewhat richer country today, 
such as Greece; some by basing projections on various rates 
of growth of GNP and population. Some make a specific 
assumption that Portugal will belong to the EEC: others do not.
H I  Suggested Methodology for Long-Term Planning Work in Portugal
(a) Long-term planning work in the Central Planning Department
23. For the reasons outlined above, the Department's prime role in
the immediate future will arise from the development aspects of 
EEC entry mentioned above. A sizeable secretariat is being 
recruited by the Commission on Portuguese Integration into the
(1) This picture is based on information from officials of the 
departments concerned.
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Community, but they will be mostly occupied with the country's 
needs in respect of particular products and sectors. They 
may not be well placed to provide all the staffwork to buttress 
more general arguments on transition periods, capital require­
ments, etc. Here it will be necessary to show the putative 
consequences of various alternative arrangements within the 
context of the basic requirements of Portugal. Even if the 
Commission's secretariat were in a position to do such work, 
it would inevitably duplicate what was being done in the Central 
Planning Department. So it would be useful for the Department in 
the next 18 months to provide this type of staffwork. I 
gather from discussions with the President and Vice-President 
of this Commission that they concur with this assessment.
24. One by-product of such work could be an annexe to a plan for 
1979-84, but if any such material is published at a l l , ^  it 
would probably be better in the form of a quite separate document.
25. The Department could also usefully prepare to discuss development
strategy with the Fourth Constitutional Government and its
(2 )successors. When those who make strategic decisions
take account of the nation's development needs, a 
planning staff can help them envisage these, by collecting the 
necessary information and making appropriate analyses. One 
type of analysis is to simulate what might be required to 
achieve consistency between certain goals for a particular 
year, on certain assumptions about constraints and exogenous 
factors. That is all, in essence, a 'plan' usually is - though 
it is a valuable technique for bringing out the hypothetical 
implications of policy choices, indeed imposing discipline on 
policymaking by drawing attention to the need for such choices.
(1) The closer planning gets to the real issues of development 
strategy, the more it has to deal with controversial issues, 
taking account of the real political objectives of policymakers, 
and working out alternatives which might be politically 
embarrassing, so the less is available for publication.
(2) Here again, part of such work might be publishable as a docu­
ment on development strategy, but again probably better not 
as just an annexe to another document, which might well have 
a shorter political life.
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26. Putting the matter in this way brings out the key differences
between the methodologies of long-term planning and other work
in the Central Planning Department. Meaningful calculations
for the near future can be made in answer to the economic question: 
"How can we minimise the foreign exchange deficit?". Alternatives 
are posed for increasing foreign exchange receipts and reducing 
payments, and from these in turn can be derived implications for 
specific changes in taxation, exchange rates, interest rates, 
income levels, etc. In these economic calculations, social and 
political institutions - land tenure, industrial structures, 
systems of labour relations, school curricula, etc - are tacitly 
assumed not to change, and major social objectives are not 
attempted.
27. In development planning, however, when the objectives normally
include a much higher level of employment, much better health
and nutrition, etc, such constraints can be relaxed. Social
and political institutions are precisely the key policy variables. 
This is much more true in Portugal than in, say, France. The 
belief that objectives such as full employment can be achieved 
in France, assuming broadly existing institutions, at any rate 
with an horizon of 1990, would be questioned by some, but it 
would not be ridiculous. In Portugal, by contrast, few would 
argue that the necessary economic changes can be made without 
far-reaching institutional changes as well - however much they 
might differ on how to define these.
(b) The role of quantification in the Department’s long-term 
work
28 * It follows that, in Portugal, planning for more than a few years 
ahead cannot be simply economic, still less can it be merely 
quantitative. There is a natural bias among planners to 
exaggerate the importance of factors which can be quantified.
This bias would be especially dangerous in Portugal. It may 
well be justifiable to make projections for quantifiable economic 
variables to illustrate some types of effects of assumptions 
about some of the causes of economic and social change.
29. Moreover, for these variables, consistency tests can be made 
within a national accounting framework. Although the effect
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of investment on output cannot be estimated at all precisely, 
such tests may well be worthwhile. In fact, however, for the 
reasons indicated above, an exercise of this kind cannot 
encompass all the main objectives of socio-economic development 
nor can it take account of most of the main socio-economic 
influences. By all means let quantitiative manipulations be 
made - provided that they are not expected to constitute 
planning, or even to take one very far.
(c) What should the horizon be?
30. There is no reason why there should be the same planning horizon 
in different sectors. This depends primarily on lead times.
If it takes eight to ten years to go through all the stages of 
an electric power project - drafting a project proposal, 
obtaining administrative approval, raising the necessary finance 
and completing the construction - then ten years is a natural 
horizon in this sector. On the other hand, it takes at least 
20 years to convert a small child into a doctor, so in educational 
planning a horizon of ten years is too short: the test of the
educational system of the 1980s will be how adequately it
meets the needs for professional and technical skills in the 
next century.
31. However, in order to achieve consistency (not merely 
quantitative) between policies in different sectors, some common 
horizon is needed. Since to create a viable socio-economic 
structure in Portugal would take several decades, there would be, 
if other things were equal, a case for development planning
to focus on the year 2000 or later. Nevertheless, in the 
particular circumstances outlined above, that might well be a 
mistake. The role of the Department in the EEC negotiations 
points to the need for a much nearer horizon.
32. It is necessary to strike a balance. On the one hand, while
there will be - because of the special agreement of 1972 - 
free trade with the Community in industrial products by 1985, 
this will not have its full effect until some years afterwards. 
However, the transition period in some other sectors will 
certainly be much longer - 199j has been mentioned as a date 
by which harmonisation is expected to be complete. On the
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other hand, Portugal should have taken on most of the 
responsibilities of Community membership by the end of the 
next decade. In any case, the arguments against long-term 
planning because of its uncertainties and the statistical 
weaknesses gain greater weight as the horizon gets further 
away. Moreover (see Section II), such sectoral planning as 
has been done mostly refers to 1990, including that of the 
Ministry of Industry, which is of crucial importance for this 
purpose. It would take time to convert these papers to a 
horizon of 2000. So the Department's earlier decision to 
choose a horizon of 1990 seems justified.
33. But only temporarily. The preparatory work for the post-1980 
constitutional Government could well have a horizon of 2000.
For the reasons given above, one cannot realistically expect 
to make a big impression on the many problems before the end of 
the century.
(d) The method of scenarios
34. The most appropriate instrument for envisaging development 
needs is the scenario, a hypothetical construction of the 
social and political structure of the country at the chosen 
horizon - described as a historian might describe Portugal at 
some past date. The scenario reflects the main social concerns, 
viz level of employment, level of education, state of health, 
equality, democracy, social peace and harmony, external 
dependence. It therefore also includes styles of consumption, 
the state of technology and the correlates of these - the 
structures of production and employment, the role of trade,
the health and other welfare services (probably with a regional 
dimension), as well as of landownership, attitudes to work and 
enterprise and ^ sterns of administration. It takes account of 
the economic constraints on obtaining these goals - limited 
foreign exchange deficits, etc. These constraints make it 
possible to test quantitatively the economic aspects of 
consistency, for example between balanced foreign payments and 
a high level of consumption. But a scenario can also test in 
broad terms the consistency between economic and other aspects - 
it may not be easy to reconcile imported technology with low 
unemployment, or highly unequal distribution of income with 
political democracy.
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35. The other major area of work is assessing what would be 
implied for the intervening years for the scenario to be 
realised - e.g. institutional changes, rates of investment 
and foreign borrowing, volume and content of education, etc.
It is particularly important to envisage processes by which 
the labour released by the necessary increases in productivity 
could be absorbed. These too can be subjected to consistency 
tests, especially their economic aspects, e.g. by concocting
a savings and investment table for one particular intervening 
year or the whole intervening period.
36. Naturally, the complexion of the government that takes office after 
the election of 1980 cannot be predicted, so it would be 
prudent to work on some alternative strategies to deal with 
the country's basic p r o b l e m s , ^  but the range of these 
alternatives need not - see Section I - be very broad.
IV Action required
(a) In the immediate future
37. The need for major advances in development planning, especially 
within the next 18 months, would justify a switch of the Depart­
ment's resources to this type of work. There are, inevitably, in 
the present political situation, limits to government interest 
in medium-term planning, which make possible this attention to 
the longer term.
38. One possibility would be to put pressure on the lagging Minis­
tries to produce the long-term sector plans already requested.
But success seems more likely if instead a new start is made 
and the Ministries participate from the outset in helping shape 
the assumptions, and are asked to react to assumptions made about 
their sectors. Naturally, the Department should stand ready 
first to help the Ministries with this work and to do some it­
self if need be.
(1) Certain governments might reject 'planning' but only if this 
is interpreted - incorrectly - as implying government 
controls. After all, scenarios are used by business 
corporations to aid decisionmaking.
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39.
40.
Any methodology must be realistic. The following steps are 
suggested:
(1) The creation of a working group, chaired by the Director 
of the Department of Planning and consisting of three or four 
officials from the Department and one or two each from planning 
departments of the other main Ministries (together with one each 
from the staff of the Commission on Integration with the EEC and 
the National Statistics Institute), which would meet regularly.
For the reasons advanced in Section III, this group would be 
charged with:
(i) In 1979 providing for each sector answers to questions 
arising out of EEC negotiations, within the framework of an 
evolving set of scenarios for 1990, the first being based on 
the assumptions that no special concessions accompany EEC entry
(ii) In the second half of 1979 and early 1980 preparing strat 
egic alternatives to be put to the government, illustrated by a 
set of scenarios for the year 2000.
Work on these two tasks will doubtless overlap, but the second 
could have a low priority for some months.
(2) The establishment, at an early meeting of this group, of a 
standard set of socio-economic goals and constraints for 1990, 
on the initiative of the Department, together with a standard 
set of values for exogenous variables. These would include:
(i) Population and labour force projections based on the 
INE1s w o r k ; ^
(ii) Projections for the total gross product of OECD members 
based on material available in the Organisation's documents.
One might want to vary the assumptions in due course - for 
example, using other migration hypotheses - but temporarily 
one set would suffice for all scenarios.
(1) "Perspectivas Demograficas, Portugal 1975-1990" (INE, 1978).
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(3) The Central Department should propose a framework of a 
hypothetical scenario (scenario A ) , which assumed a continuation 
of past trends and existing policies, and no institutional 
changes other than the minimum implied by EEC entry - i.e. no 
special concessions. Such a framework would include base-year
and horizon projections f o r : ^
(i) Exports, tourist receipts and migrants1 remittances;
(ii) Consumption, investment and government spending;
(iii) Production and employment in the main sectors;
Civ) Unemployment;
Cv) Imports, including invisible payments.
41. There would, of course, be an iterative process, with the group,
under the guidance of the Department, revising the first 
round of assumptions in the light of scrutiny by the other 
ministries and doubtless counter-estimates for sectorial produc­
tion, etc. However, revisions would not be made in the first 
stage to remove inconsistencies in the form of (say) projected 
foreign payments deficits or unemployment or regional imbalances 
because the whole object of Scenario A would be to bring out what 
problems can be anticipated if no special concessions are 
available from the EEC.
42. The next stage would depend in part on progress in the EEC
negotiations, but an obvious step would be to introduce
constraints on the foreign payments deficit, the level of 
unemployment and regional imbalances, and to ask what special
(1) This exercise would have to be done in fixed prices in the
first instance. Of course, what would constitute 'past trends' 
would be itself a matter for discussion. So would the choice 
of a base year, but presumably it would be the latest for which 
fairly comprehensive data are available. It would have to be in 
the period 1974-79, if only because the labour force surveys 
only started in 1974. Agreement must naturally be reached on 
what the level of unemployment was in the base year, to 
eliminate the current conspicuous inconsistency: the base wil 
presumably be the labour force surveys, though the results need 
adjustment for the substantial population excluded, living in 
unregistered dwellings.
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concessions from the EEC and changes in social and political
institutions in Portugal would be needed to achieve a consistent
scenario - with, of course, no doubt two or three "versions
being prepared. The political content of this would naturally 
depend largely on the government of the day.
(b) Planning planning
43. In due course the Planning Group could discuss how planning 
could be developed after 1980, in the light of experience. This
has many aspects. One is how much such staffwork needs
decentralising. The administration proposes to create regional 
planning authorities. If regional governments are set up, their 
role and power will depend on the extent of political and 
administrative devolution. So will the partitioning of planning 
responsibility between the centre and the r e g i o n s . ^
44. It is not for a foreign consultant to suggest how other interests
might participate in the planning process. This depends on the
broader question of how they are to be involved in the negotiations 
on the entry of Portugal into the EEC (and later issues of
development strategies). It would not be appropriate to 
introduce outside representation on issues of technical staff- 
work unless machinery is established for consulting them on 
the major political issues that arise in the negotiations.
However, if such machinery is not established, the degree' of 
popular involvement in development strategies will be limited.
45. Another item which will come onto the Group's agenda will be
the improvement of statistics. An integral part of the
evolution of planning is the evolution of statistics in 
respect of quality, comprehensiveness, promptness, etc. It
may, for example, not merely be necessary to improve basic 
data on productive sectors, but also to request a preliminary 
tabulation (possibly based on a sample) of the 1980 census. 
Statistical priorities will emerge as work progresses, and
(1) See "Relatorio preliminar para a defini ~ das grandes opcoes 
do PMP 1979-84" (Secretariat of State Planning, 1978)) 
pp 105-6.
needs become apparent. One need already obvious is information 
on the income produced and labour time required in the small­
holdings of the North, precisely a crucial area for both EEC 
negotiations and development planning. Key indicators also need 
selecting - or in some cases creating (e.g. to measure 
technological dependence and social needs) - corresponding to the 
scope of planning.
46. The advancement of planning will require some priorities
in research, much of which will have to be undertaken in 
universities and research institutes (such as the work currently 
being undertaken at the Gulbenkian Institute of Science for the 
Integration Commission on the implications of EEC membership for 
the* agricultural sector). Such work will, inter alia, strengthen 
the Universities and help make their syllabi more relevant to 
Portugal's needs, so that they produce graduates able to 
help plan the country's development.
DUDLEY SEERS
- 18 -
DS/MR
9.11.78
